Van Gogh's letters have played a crucial role in the shaping of his reputation as a painter. This is so because the letters provide a wealth of information about not only his painterly practice but also his intensely lived, brief life. Consequently, it has been all too inviting to make connections between the dramatically tragic aspects of his biography and the incandescent paintings, which can readily be seen as his most heartfelt and revealing self-expression.
Introduction 5 "method, logic," and "structure," although this new focus has opened up important new perspectives on Van Gogh's life and work. 4 A variety of impressive studies has contributed to the shift Leighton describes, but I will not dwell on this interesting body of scholarship for the simple reason that the accounts rendered to date of Van Gogh's remarkable genius are marked by a significant omission, which, in a previous study as well as in this one, I am especially concerned to address. This omission has to do with how extraordinary the letters are in their own right, as literature. In The Event of Literature, Terry Eagleton addresses this point at some length, arguing that it is incorrect to say that if a concept has no definable essence, it is therefore vacuous. 6 To clarify the point, Eagleton looks to Wittgenstein's idea of "family resemblances" (20), the complex networks of overlapping similarities that bind our activities together in much the same way as a family is bound together by numerous overlapping affinities. Although the "essence" of a large extended family cannot be clearly described, it can nonetheless, for practical purposes, make sense to talk about such a family as an actual entity.
As Eagleton goes on to point out, however, one problem with family-resemblance theory is that, with a little ingenuity, we can find similarities among all kinds of randomly selected objects. Whatever attributes are held to be pertinent in any actual case must therefore be judged to have a specific significance, and this brings us back to the problem of, again, providing necessary and sufficient conditions along essentialist lines (23). That is, at some point, judgement has to intervene -to tie the knot, as it were, at the end of a thread that is otherwise endlessly drawn in the wake of an ever-inquisitive needle on the hunt for an ever-elusive definition. And so, although Eagleton agrees that there is no "essence" to literature, he looks for anchorage in certain "empirical categories, not theoretical ones" (25) , based on what people generally have in mind when they talk about this topic:
They mean by "literary" a work which is fictional, or which yields significant insight into human experience as opposed to reporting empirical truths, or which uses language in a peculiarly heightened, figurative or self-conscious way, or which is not practical in the sense that shopping lists are, or which is highly valued as a piece of writing. (25) On the family-resemblance model, these criteria are interconnected by way of overlapping affinities and thereby provide a set of guidelines that "help cast light on the nature of literature-talk" (32 Self-Fashioning, Stephen Greenblatt makes a strong case for texts being inextricably involved in "larger networks of meaning in which both the author and his works participate," so that neither literature nor the reader exists in a sealed-off universe of discourse. 7 For Greenblatt, self-fashioning (the idea that we have some autonomy in shaping the kind of person we want to be) is curtailed by the social and historical circumstances that shape us, beyond our full understanding. It is impossible, Greenblatt says, to reconstruct fully either the cultures of past ages or our own culturally coded interactions with them (5).
Consequently, the process of self-fashioning, like the process of reading, is "resolutely dialectical" (1), and the "impurities," "indeterminacy and incompleteness" built into it are ineradicable, even as the "I" being fashioned takes on "characteristic modes of expression, recurrent narrative patterns," and the like (5-6).
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Introduction 9 But an analysis, such as Greenblatt's, that insists on contradiction, incompleteness, and the interplay of cultural codes is likely to find
that any text at all is interesting and relevant as grist for the analytical mill. The question of whether or not "literature" is a useful category is not especially pressing here, because a resolutely pursued historicism effectively absorbs the aesthetic into a discussion of cultural production, thereby leaving us with a problem that is the exact opposite of Heidegger's ahistoricism.
As accomplished thinkers, Heidegger and Greenblatt take steps to address the counter-case to their own predominant emphases. But I am mainly interested here in the predominant emphases themselves and in the gap with which they confront us between a resolute "hermeneutic of Being," on the one hand, and a resolute historicism, on the other. In attempting to bridge this gap, I have found Mikhail Bakhtin to be especially helpful because he presents strong arguments in support of the idea that although texts are indeed shaped by an endless interplay of cultural codes, nonetheless a high value can also be placed on the idea of literature. That is, for Bakhtin, the alternative to a single, clear meaning is not a merely chaotic relativism but a tension-fraught, dialogical exchange on the threshold, an exchange that he finds em- 
Bakhtin, Dialogue, and the Self Interrupted
In his study of Dostoevsky's poetics, Bakhtin argues that to be human is to be in communication, and thus "to be for another, and through the other, for one's self."
within specific historical situations. This is what Bakhtin means when he says that "through the other" one comes to a sense of "one's self."
But, as Holquist points out, the relationship between "I" and "other" Bakhtin's word for the endlessly complex and unobjectifiable multiplicity of dialogues that constitute the human quest for stability and meaning is "heteroglossia." In every individual case of self-fashioning, this multiplicity of dialogues affords the opportunities and constraints in terms of which a person can be "through the other, for one's self."
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Personal identity is thus shaped by a process that is multi-directional rather than linear, entailing an array of dialogical relationships within some of which, for instance, I might well shift my persona, aims, and allegiances. But if my persona (the face that I present to the world, for practical purposes) becomes merely a kaleidoscope of expedient manoeuvres, my identity will volatilize accordingly, and instead of "making something of myself " (as the saying goes), I will "come to nothing." By contrast, a person's self-fashioning, amidst the all-butinfinite range of potential dialogues on offer, entails specific engagements, patterns of response, ways of imagining and thinking, which in turn can take on the shape of a narrative -"the story of my life."
Still, this narrative is never complete, nor is it without discontinuities doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990455.01 and contradictions, because the self is a provisional synthesis rather than a self-identical essence. The Buddha and David Hume were right about this -and so is Bakhtin.
In his book on Dostoevsky, Bakhtin develops these ideas about self-fashioning specifically in relation to literature, his main claim being that Dostoevsky's characters are given the status of "authentic" subjects independent of the author's own subjectivity. 11 That is, Dostoevsky renders the "unfinalizability" of the people whom he depicts, and, in so doing, his art "liberates and de-reifies the human being" (61, 63). Dostoevsky's novels thus provide special insight into the process whereby the self is shaped dialogically, and, in his writing, "referential meaning" is "indissolubly fused with the position of a personality"
(93). The result is that the drama of self-fashioning is itself thematized through the multiple or "polyphonic" dialogical structures within the novel. Bakhtin points also to Dostoevsky's fondness for doubles and "paired characters" and for a dramatized sense of "simultaneity" and "co-existence" whereby people are inserted into relationships through which, in turn, they discover their own personal trajectories (28). The When Merleau-Ponty applies these ideas to language, he sounds very much like Bakhtin. For instance, in Signs, we learn that speech is "always only a fold in the immense fabric of language," with which we are taken up in a perpetual dialogical relationship that does not "leave a place for pure meaning." Within this dialogue, "at the moment of expression the other to whom I address myself and I who express myself are incontestably linked together." 12 Elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty goes on to explain that in such an "exchange," "there are never quite two of us and yet one is never alone." Signs, Merleau-Ponty extends this principle to painting, arguing that a painter "is no more capable of seeing his paintings than the writer is capable of reading his work." Rather, "it is in others that expression takes on its relief and really becomes signification" -which is to say, the significance of the work is opened up by way of a dialogical relationship with the reader or viewer, thereby extending the significance of the work beyond the artist's specific intent, or "personal vibration"
and "inner monologue" (52).
This is not to say that readers or viewers grasp the whole significance either. As we have seen, language does not give us "transparent significations" (41) and meaning is "never completed" (42 presents us with "a way of seeing" and of "inhabiting the world," offering "a certain relationship to being" (53-54). But Merleau-Ponty goes on to stress that the internal organization of the work of art achieves a certain "equilibrium," as a result of which the text is, as it were, in dialogue with itself, holding its own internal contradictions in suspension (43). In turn, this internal dialogue expresses a distinctive way of inhabiting the world, with which we are also invited to engage. Here, a
Heideggerian understanding of the truth of art as disclosure joins with a dialogical view of the artifact as culturally situated and contested, reducible neither to the author's intent nor to a reader's interpretation.
Embodied Intentions: The Textual Dynamics of Self-Fashioning
These comments on intentionality and on the text being in dialogue with itself can return us now to Eagleton, who, on the topic of intention, offers an argument quite similar to Merleau-Ponty's, except that
Eagleton also introduces what he describes as "a fruitful distinction" between asking what an author has in mind and what the "intention"
of the text itself is (148). As we see in the work of Bakhtin and MerleauPonty, a text cannot be reduced to the intentional utterance of a single person, the author, but a text nonetheless can have a high degree of coherence -through imagery, diction, constellations of ideas, and so on. Eagleton suggests that these can also be usefully described as "intentions," of which, again, "authors know little or nothing" (148). I am reminded here of a friend who was once involved with security at a racetrack. When undesirables were banned from the premises, security guards would try to remember not their faces but their gaits as the best way of recognizing them if they turned up again. Unconsciously, the body has a pattern of movement that is recognizable to others but not to the person whose body it is. Likewise, the body of a text can be the bearer of a significance of which the author is unaware. Eagleton describes this as the text being "faithful to the law of its own being"
(60) -the embodiment of meanings, as in Merleau-Ponty's "way of seeing," that are unselfconsciously expressed or intended.
It follows that the text is in dialogue not just with the reader but also with itself insofar as it attains a distinctive "equilibrium" in tune with "the law of its own being." For Eagleton, this internal dialogue is a fundamental "strategy" of the literary artifact, and here he is drawn to Fredric Jameson, who sees literature as raising from within itself the ideological issues and contexts to which it then also offers a response (177). As Eagleton says, "paradoxically, the literary work of art projects out of its own innards the very historical and ideological subtext to which it is a strategic reply" (170). In conducting a dialogue with itself, the text therefore puts on offer a way of "inhabiting the world" that engages with the reader, again dialogically: "there are never quite two of us and yet one is never alone."
My main aim in this study is to read Van Gogh's letters in the context of the ideas I have here broadly set out. Although, as we have seen, "literature" eludes precise definition, I follow Eagleton in maintaining that it is not an empty concept and that "literaturetalk" can be valuable and productive, even if the domain itself is often contested. Throughout, I want to retain Heidegger's idea that the literary imagination reveals occluded aspects of familiar experiences and objects and that these disclosures can be valuable in extending our understanding of the world and of one another. But I want also to acknowledge that literature is a product of particular historical and cultural circumstances and is the site of contradictions, aporias, distortions, and irresolutions of various kinds. As Greenblatt says, its structure is "resolutely dialectical" (1) and, as he goes on to point out, is richly contaminated by the interaction between its codes, the codes of the culture within which it was produced, and the codes of its readers. Bakhtin's "heteroglossia" likewise draws attention to this perpetual negotiation of meaning, both in human culture as the site of our individual and communal self-fashioning and in how we engage with literary texts. In this negotiation, we have some degree of autonomy, even though the modes of production within which we find ourselves situated are the bearers of a significance that shapes our intent beyond our full understanding. Eagleton correctly talks about the text itself as having an "intention" that embodies a "way doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990455.01
Introduction 15 of seeing" in excess of the author's conscious awareness, as MerleauPonty affirms. Consequently, when I talk about self-fashioning in Van Gogh's letters, I do not just mean the descriptions that they offer of the events of his life. Rather, as with Bakhtin's reading of Dostoevsky, I mean that one key criterion relevant to the assessment of Van Gogh's letters as literature is that the process of self-fashioning is itself thematized by the internal dialogues that the letters conduct with themselves. That is, Van Gogh's letters raise, from within themselves, questions and issues to which they also respond. This is the central "strategy" by which they acquire the stylistic "equilibrium," the embodied "way of seeing" that invites our attention and engagement.
As it happens, in Van Gogh's case, the process of self-fashioning through the interaction of self and other is especially intense because
Van Gogh well knew the unusual fragility of his ego, the "I" called to shape itself in the image of an other. Throughout his life, his mental stability was a concern, and, in turn, this special vulnerability helps to explain why he was such a resolute idealist. For Van Gogh, that is, ideals had objective value and were strongly self-identical, offering thereby a counterweight and antidote to his personal instability.
But, again, the literary quality of his writing lies not just in this kind of biographical description but also in how his letters reproduce the process of an unusually intense self-fashioning by way of their own internal structures.
Conclusion: Van Gogh's "Double-Voiced Discourse"
As a way now of bringing Van Gogh into the foreground, I would like to return to Bakhtin's remarks on Dostoevsky's "fondness for doubles"
and for the kinds of "juxtaposition and counterpointing" by which the simultaneous co-existence of self and other is represented in the novels (28). These dialogical structures in turn engage us in the "inescapable open-endedness" of the self-fashioning to which we are committed by virtue of being human and which is accompanied always by contest experience, and even of personal identity, is also necessary. In the conclusion, I offer a synthesis of the preceding arguments, while also drawing briefly on reader-response theory to suggest that there is a significant analogy between the dialogical structure of the letters and the reader's dialogical encounter with them.
As I noted at the start of this introduction, a literary-critical approach to Van Gogh's collected correspondence needs to be responsive to the imaginative complexity, power, and coherence of his writing. But the letters also need to be read within the context of modern literary-theoretical discourse if we are to attend effectively to Van Gogh's writerly strategies and thereby open a path to the further discussions that his letters will surely elicit as they enter fully into their own domain, as literature. Consequently, in the following chapters, I make the case that Van Gogh's correspondence can be fruitfully interpreted by way of the ideas about dialogue and selffashioning described in this introduction and, especially, by how the process of self-fashioning is thematized within the texts of the letters themselves.
